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Wolfgang KUBIN*
I. Introduction
 In recent years I have repeatedly tried to draw the attention of my 
colleagues to the fact that in comparison with other fi elds such as philosophy, 
history, or English literature, the subject area of Sinology (traditional China) 
or Chinese studies (modern China) seem to be behind the times by at least 
fi fty years. But probably I have issued my warning in vain. We still fi ght 
battles of the past that take us nowhere. In the following I shall try to show 
that the idea of an autochthonous culture is no longer up-to-date and that it 
leads us in the wrong direction.
 For my diffi cult undertaking I prefer the form of the essay, as it enables 
me to speak out and to go without footnotes. I am afraid footnotes might 
offend some readers as names and titles would have to be dropped, or might 
disturb them as almost all books that would be quoted are in German.
 The crisis in our fi eld deepened when the Chinese side at the end of the 
1990s announced the politics of zouchuqu (走出去), the politics of “going 
abroad,” or that of translating and introducing Chinese culture for the “West” 
on its own. China would no further rely upon any scholars from foreign 
countries, who in its eyes misunderstand Chinese masterpieces, and distort the 
“sound” image of China according to their own biases. In the process, China 
has turned itself into a victim of the “West.”
 We meet here with a kind of hostile hermeneutics, a claim to truth and a 
view of the Chinese people as the best messengers of China past and present. 
It is easy to understand that any nation would feel entitled to such an attitude 
towards the outside world, including the Japanese as well as the Americans—
only Japanese understand Japan, only Americans understand America the right 
way. But there is no true image of China, Japan, or the United States. There 
can be only different views that different people nurture and change all the 
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time. This is even the case when someone talks about his own country. I also 
have never maintained a static picture of Germany. I see my motherland and 
myself as always changing.
 To believe in a certain understanding of China as fi xed forever and 
obligatory for everyone is not so much an expression of chauvinism or 
resentment, but the result of a lack of knowledge of the character of civiliza-
tion. Our opinions offer only possible perspectives that we need to discuss, 
nothing more. They do not amount to historical “truth.” All they need to be is 
logical, new, and of interest, not a boring copy of prejudices always repeated 
in the same way.
 Nowadays, in very advanced translation theory, the obviously strange 
phrase “translated modernity” is quite common. It means that no society 
attains its modern existence from itself, but that its modernity is derived from 
something else, from something outside. The simplest example in our case is 
the work of Karl Marx (1818‒1883) in Chinese. It is no exaggeration to say 
that if Marx’s theory had not been translated, there would be no “New 
China.” Something similar can be found in the role loanwords play in East 
Asian languages. Through the impact of translation or of phonetic assimila-
tion, “classical” Chinese changes to modern Chinese, etc. The German idea of 
“Fortschritt” (progress), for instance, probably becomes in Japanese (進步
shimpō), and in Chinese, jinbu (进步). The English word for “cake” turns into 
the Japanese word, “kēki,” etc. Many words we use today only seem on the 
surface to be true words of our mother tongue. In fact, many Chinese or 
Japanese binomials have a foreign origin, but by bringing loan words home 
they soon lose their original fl avor in our mother tongue.
 It is not only in China that purists demand a return to their own traditions. 
In contemporary France, for instance, the government decided many years 
ago to protect the French language by law; otherwise, it was expected to 
quickly become a victim of American English. The French now speak and 
write poor English. This is quite different from Germany after the Second 
World War. Being liberated by American and English forces we learnt the 
language of our former “enemies” quite well.
 All those who now advocate for a kind of guocui (国粹), a national essence 
to ward off foreign infi ltration (Überfremdung), do not take into account that 
very often even in traditional societies culture or civilization were only 
possible through encounter with others. China before the arrival of Buddhism 
(65 A.D.) was quite different from China after its arrival. No one would deny 
that the Buddhist Chinese Middle Ages (220‒907) opened a splendid chapter 
of great civilization in China. Similarly, the Renaissance (15th and 16th 
centuries) came into being in certain parts of Europe when ancient Greek and 
old Roman civilizations, both heathen, were fi nally rediscovered by Christian 
125Culture as Encounter
thinkers. In the end Germany is today more Greek, Roman, French, and 
English, perhaps even more American, than German. Only the rightists in our 
country ask us Germans for more blue eyes and blond hair.
 Unfortunately, we can still hear elsewhere voices that call for a pure culture 
of their own. The movement for guocui, for Chineseness through the help of 
guoxue (国学; national studies), in modern and contemporary China is but one 
example among many. In its darkest times, Germany strove for “Deutschtum” 
(Germaneness). The result was a total disaster. No need to repeat what 
everyone knows. The case of the still eminent German philosopher Martin 
Heidegger (1889‒1976) is awful and shameful enough. But until now no one 
has obviously paid any attention to the following fact: When China under the 
infl uence of the Occident produced the best of modern world literature 
between 1912 and 1949, about nine fascist countries in Europe had no 
modern literature to offer the public at all. In 1930 German writers without 
outside pressure were already demanding to avoid modernity just as Chinese 
writers did before and after 1942. Modernity means internationalism. 
Internationalism prohibits “Germaneness” or “Chineseness.” Between 1933 
and 1945 Berlin prohibited the translation of all modern literary works from 
abroad. Even in the 1950s, German-speaking countries had not yet recovered 
from the loss of understanding of the essence of literature in modern times 
and had therefore to (re)learn through the help of foreign authors what the 
writing of the day should be, eventually including even Chinese writers such 
as Lu Xun (1881‒1936).
 The same is true for China during the Cultural Revolution (1966‒1976). 
What was demanded was zili gengsheng (自力更生; do it yourself): Do not 
learn from foreigners, only face yourself; do not translate anything from 
abroad, only translate yourself into the language of the Party. The result is 
well known. Morally, Germany became the most backward country in the 
world in those years, while China became the most backward economically.
 Now both countries are back in the international community. Why? They 
are open—open to foreign views and they are translating nearly everything. 
This leads us to a serious question. If one is open and absorbs the “Other,” is 
one still oneself? The Self and the Other now play an important role in the 
discussion of postcolonial theory. The problem is that eager representatives of 
post-colonialism in the fi eld of Chinese studies do not seem to understand 
suffi ciently the complexity of history and philosophy; they are not even yet 
willing to comprehend it because any kind of deeper knowledge would make 
the learning of many old and new languages necessary. Neither Chinese-
speaking nor English-speaking scholars are prepared to do so. They often 
regard anything they read or write in Chinese or English as true, as the only 
truth. Thus they do harm to the research of China. Chinese history is bigger 
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than the current issues of the so-called clash of friend and enemy, self and 
other, man and woman, local and foreigner. Besides, philosophy is now much 
more complex than to be inclined to answer the question of any identity in a 
simple manner.
II. Encounters and Identity
 When we talk about encounters, what are we talking about? Are encoun-
ters possible? And if so, can we, must we save our “self” during an 
encounter with the Other and not become part of the Other just as the Other 
also becomes part of our Self? Has any scholar in our fi eld clarifi ed what 
“encounter” means? Any kind of encounter means change; if not, it is not an 
encounter. It is small talk or even worse, it is only a means to reassure 
oneself. To come to terms with this issue, allow me fi rst to be a little bit 
vulgar. So often when confronted with our food in Germany Chinese tourists 
run into so-called Chinese restaurants between Cologne and Berlin just to eat 
so-called Chinese food and nod to one another to indicate that Chinese food 
is the best in the world. But at the same time, they expect us Germans when 
in Guangdong Province to cherish chicken feet and the ears of pigs. On the 
streets of Bonn, where every day hundreds of Chinese visit the home of 
Beethoven, we sometimes can hear Chinese voices saying, “Our old Chinese 
culture.” But Bonn is much older than Beijing!
 When Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749‒1832) went into the deepest 
crisis of his life during the liberation wars in Europe (1813‒1815) he turned 
to China. He wrote a famous poem about a tree that went from the Middle 
Kingdom during the Song Dynasty (960‒1279) to Japan and from Japan 
around 1735 to the Netherlands, and fi nally to the Weimar Republic around 
1800, where our poet lived. The tree I talk of is the gingko (Japn. ginkyō; 
Chin. yinxing 银杏), which is now quite common as a word and as a tree in 
the German language and in German parks.
 To clarify the problem of identity, let me fi rst ask some silly questions. 
Has any gingko tree in the Botanical garden of Bonn University lost its “self” 
and does it really want to go back through a Japanese port to Chinese soil? 
Or is it possible that this magnifi cent tree is able to strengthen itself even in 
a country not its own? Goethe answers this question indirectly by refl ecting 
upon the character of the gingko. He asks if its essence (Wesen) is made of 
one or more potential. We all know that this Chinese tree is very special, as 
it is both male and female. It is one tree with two genders. Thus, Goethe, 
when refl ecting upon a gingko that he probably saw in Heidelberg in 1815, 
fi nished his poem by asking, “do my songs not give the feeling / that I am 
one and two?”
 How to understand here “one and two”? Does it mean that man and woman 
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are one? That China/Japan and Germany/Europe are one? Or do we have to 
see the two lines in the sense of modernity? Modern man is divided into two 
persons? Tradition asked for one personality, the personality of obedience. 
Everyone had a certain place in society; (wo)man had never to move and had 
to follow the rules of the church or aristocracy. But bourgeois modernity 
created the individual who no longer allowed any priest or duke to decide his 
fate; this individual tried to fi nd a new position in or outside society. After 
that he was split into two personalities: into the person he was and into the 
person he wanted to be. G.W.F. Hegel (1770‒1831) called this “the unfortu-
nate consciousness.”
 Since then the quest for identity has become an important issue. Marx 
and his followers tried to solve it through revolution. Did they succeed? Their 
ideals ended up misapplied in the Soviet Union and as despotism in North 
Korea. Meanwhile, all societies have so many identity problems that suicide 
is a common cause of death for people under 35.
 Goethe speaks of a double identity: his own identity and an identity 
probably made up of Chinese and German elements. But he stands at the 
beginning of modernity, not at the end, as we might stand. After him people 
thought in the 19th century just as now in China that nationalism, the nation 
state, etc. would lead to personal identity. Nowadays, where all nationalism 
more or less has failed in Europe, one might think of soccer, which seems to 
be a uniting force for people in Great Britain and on the European continent. 
But all of this nourishes only illusions about the possibility of fi nding or 
creating identity in the 21st century. Contemporary German philosophy has 
long declared we are not one person, we are many persons. Forerunners of 
this philosophy can be seen in the Chinese Middle Ages when the literati 
were Buddhist, Taoist, and Confucian at the same time. This is partly even 
true for the Song dynasty.
 Multiple identities were perhaps the rule even before modernity; single 
identity is an illusion after modernity. But scholars in Chinese studies still 
demand or dream of an autochthonous China. A so-called pure China, 
however, has not existed since the Later Han dynasty (25‒220 A.D.), if at all. 
Even worse, its remnants were destroyed before and after the May 4th (1919) 
Movement and in the years after 1949 by the Chinese themselves. The revo-
lutionaries permanently destroyed what their ancestors had built up over three 
thousand years, and they did this nearly completely, all in the name of revo-
lution or reform after 1911.
 Despite this fact, American and Chinese scholars in Chinese studies now 
ask “us Europeans” to respect “Chineseness,”or anything in China with so 
called Chinese characteristics—in short, Chinese identity. But there is none. 
Marx is a foreigner on the mainland and the idolized W.I. Lenin (1870‒
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1924), is, too. On Taiwan, in Hong Kong, and in Macau, America is the 
model. And if there has been any identity in the Chinese-speaking world 
during the last one-hundred years, it is the identity of the destructive urge and 
a feeling of inferiority. Both phenomena are of course problematic.
 Besides, more important is the fact that postmodernity does not allow one 
or two identities anymore as was traditionally possible or as Goethe made an 
appeal for. I repeat: Everybody has many identities now, unfortunately, even 
including comic fi gures (manga). So why in Chinese studies are academics 
still talking about the “Self” and the “Other”? “You and me” are not different 
entities anymore. We are the same under the rubric of “lost identity.” This is 
true for any culture. Goethe at the end of his life was as “Chinese” as he was 
“German.”
 Even if there is still the phenomenon of “self and other,” no one asks 
where the “self” comes from and what the “other” really is or means. When 
we are born are we self or other? Some stupid German literati like to declare 
in public that they were never asked if they wanted to be born or not. Thus, 
they differentiate themselves before and after birth, or between their “self” 
and their “other.” I asked many German philosophers where our “self” (Ich) 
stems from, and they had no answer. It seems that only Chinese and 
American scholars have a reply. Their problem is that they do not read much 
in the original language except in Chinese or English. Rather, they read 
translations, i.e. they read interpretations, and they read them in their 
languages and in their frame of understanding. Thus, bias comes in. Bias as 
refl ected by contemporary German philosophy is actually a good thing so 
long as it allows us to ponder upon the possibility of our understanding. Bias 
then might turn from prejudice (Vorurteil) to “judgement” (Urteil). This is 
called the hermeneutic circle. Its precondition is the knowledge of history and 
of languages.
 Let me ask again: Do we really belong to “us” and not at the same time 
to the “other”? When we believe in God we are his, not us, as we are often 
told by certain hymns in church or by poets before modernity. When we fall 
in love we often say, “I am yours.” We give up ourselves and become 
another person.
 Most problematic in humanities is the demand of Chinese, be they 
politicians, scholars, or writers, for a national literature even today. Since 
Goethe in 1827 spoke of world literature, he pronounced the end of any 
national literature. Not only was Mao Zedong (1893‒1976) totally behind the 
times when he asked for a return of modern Chinese literature, which was 
then of international character, to autochthonous forms in 1942, even contem-
porary poets of Chinese origin now living abroad, like Yang Lian (b.1955), 
oppose Chinese literature as international literature in the fi rst place. All are 
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of the same opinion: Literary works in the Chinese language have to be 
Chinese before anything else. Why are they so backward and lacking 
Goethe’s deep insight into the essence of writing in modern times? No need 
to answer this question because any sincere answer would hardly be accepted 
by American or Chinese scholars, who often lack a thorough understanding 
of the complexity of European history. Prejudice in the bad sense and 
ideology in its worst are sometimes too much their business. When talking 
about Goethe and the term “world literature,” not a few of them still try out 
of context to show that behind this giant of German literature and his inge-
nious idea of a modern literature for the world lurk some kind of nationalism 
and Eurocentrism. Nationalism in today’s sense, however, is a late notion and 
phenomenon. The same is true for Eurocentrism. Goethe and his times were 
open to cultures from outside of Europe. This is little known because of the 
language barrier.
 Besides, Germany was quite a different country after 1949 as opposed to 
1989. What do I mean by this? These days [May 2015] we commemorate the 
end of World War II. Not only does our German chancellor Angela Merkel (b. 
1954) go to Dachau, the German concentration camp for German Jews, but 
Simon Rattle (b.1955), the British conductor of the Berlin Symphony, asks his 
violinists to play the best German music by using violins rescued from 
concentration camps and restored by Jewish friends. Would something like 
that be possible in Japan for Chinese victims of World War II, or in China for 
the Chinese victims of the Cultural Revolution? I am afraid probably not. Not 
to mention other occurrences in recent Chinese history we are silenced from 
talking about.
III. Problems in American and Chinese Scholarship
 Again, prejudice from the prospective of contemporary German philos-
ophy actually should not be a great problem. So long as one knows that one 
has to go on from one’s prejudice to another step of recognition that might be 
less prejudiced, such a circle would be of no harm for creation of a less 
biased view. But since the victory of the theory of post-colonialism, Chinese 
studies are less a matter of scholarship than a tendency towards ideology. 
Whatever we Europeans, male and white, did when researching and trans-
lating China, according to the American intellectual Edward W. Said (1935‒
2003) and his followers in Chinese studies, is regarded as a crime. From our 
European standpoint our critics are of course wrong because they do not 
understand our language, our history, our viewpoint. And most important, 
they are quite reluctant to understand!
 The history of understanding itself is so complicated that it needs the 
knowledge of many languages and of many historical facts. But the theory of 
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post-colonialism is not really open to unbiased thinking. This is the reason 
why it is so successful. American and Chinese scholarship is textbook 
scholarship. American and Chinese scholars more or less can only read 
translations of European thinkers and thus imagine they understand what they 
would hardly understand in the original works.
 Just to give a simple example: The German Jew Walter Benjamin (1892
‒1940) is always quoted by English- and Chinese-speaking scholars in 
Chinese studies, but rarely by German colleagues. The reason is that only 
American and Chinese academics seem to understand him because they read 
him in translation, but we Germans do not really understand his diffi cult 
German in the original, so we barely quote him. Besides, without deep 
knowledge of his Judaism one gets only a small glimpse of his ideas.
 American textbook scholarship is so-called scholarship, a scholarship 
without suffi cient knowledge of Latin, Greek, German, Hebrew, or French. 
What do scholars on the basis of one language (Chinese) or of two languages 
(English and Chinese) create? First of all they formulate misconceptions 
because they cannot check the originals. And most problematic is that they do 
not seem to be eager to comprehend any important work in the original 
language other than in Chinese and/or English. But they are always quoting 
the most diffi cult French contemporary philosophers whom only specialists in 
German-speaking countries are able to follow.
 Why do I stress the ideological factor in American scholarship so much? 
Many books or articles in the United States tell two different stories. The fi rst 
story might be a story about China, for instance. The second story, however, 
is the fi ght against Europe, against Old Europe that many of their ancestors 
escaped from for religious, political, or economic reasons. Now one can read 
in English-language writings any kind of nonsense. To give you only one 
example: American scholars recently invented the term, “European imperi-
alism.” But there was never a European imperialism; there was, for instance, 
only Turkish, British, Russian or French imperialism. Iceland or Switzerland 
or Finland or Slovakia never conquered China. It is also not true that the 
“West” invaded the Middle Kingdom. It was the British, then the French, then 
the Americans, and fi nally the Russians and the Japanese. There was no 
Finland, no Slovenia, as these countries that are considered the “West” did 
not exist then.
 American scholarship is collective scholarship. Everyone quotes the same 
books, the same authors, the same ideas. The prayer wheel calls for the 
similarity of thinking: You think what I think, I think what you think. Just as 
in China, scholars only refl ect what others repeat. In Beijing it is the Party 
that stipulates the rules; at Harvard, Yale, or Princeton it is the institution of 
refereed journals and the reader who works for these journals who helps 
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publishing houses to do the editing. Both decide in Chinese studies what can 
be produced and what cannot. New or radical thought has not much chance. 
Figures such as Karl Marx or Friedrich Nietzsche (1844‒1900), if they were 
still among us, would never be allowed to get published in English-language 
refereed journals or in an English-language university press by readers 
nowadays. They are politically incorrect. Their English would not be up to 
American standards, and most of all, they might be critical of the United 
States. For Europeans it is a strange phenomenon that scholars in the United 
States barely endure any criticism of their country or they almost prefer to 
avoid being critical of their motherland.
IV. The “Other” and the “Self”
 The “other” is not an enemy of the “self;” it is rather, a friend. It helps 
one to overcome weaknesses and to fi nd one’s way. The most familiar 
examples are Ezra Pound (1885‒1972) and Bertholt Brecht (1898‒1956). As 
both have already many times been introduced to a greater readership, 
including by myself, I do not want to go too much into detail here. It will be 
suffi cient to remind you of the fact that the American poet in 1914 success-
fully started to rejuvenate literature in English-speaking countries through 
Chinese Classical aesthetics and poetry, whereas the German found (1920) his 
language, his style, and his world views through the reading of Laozi’s Daode 
Jing in German. The most infl uential translation (1911) was done by Richard 
Wilhelm (1873‒1930), who, as a pastor, preferred the language of the New 
Testament for his rendering. Choosing the way of Taoist philosophy did not 
mean getting lost in the “other” for Brecht, just the opposite. Not only he, but 
many other German writers and artists in his time and long after him grew an 
awareness of how to create great art.
 On the Chinese side we discover something similar. Feng Zhi (1905‒
1993), for instance, wrote his 27 great sonnets (1942) under the infl uence of 
Goethe, Rainer Maria Rilke (1875‒1926), and the German philosopher Karl 
Jaspers (1883‒1969). The same is true for Lu Xun, who, under the impact of 
European intellectual history, invented the modern Chinese short story or the 
Chinese prose-poem.
 In both cases, be it Germany or China, it is the “other” that is expanding 
someone’s “self.” One might of course ask, if the process of translation if 
acquisition and the treating of the “other” does not lose its uniqueness. Yes, 
perhaps so, but this is not something that only happens when one culture 
encounters another. This also happens in one and the same culture. The 
philosophers of the Song and Ming (1368‒1644) dynasties saw The Four 
Books (Sishu) of Confucianism in a totally different light than the way they 
were outlined in antiquity, namely as four single scriptures by Confucius (551
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‒479) and others. The concept of the junzi (君子) changed from monarch to 
gentleman, thus totally distorting the historical aspect.
 In this respect, it is unfair to accuse such translators as the German 
missionary Richard Wilhelm of simply reading Christian elements into the 
Chinese classics when rendering them into highly readable German. Even the 
Chinese do not have an understanding of their heritage that is bound to one 
direction of interpretation for all. A good text is always open; it allows any 
reader to follow his predilections, so long as one is able to give good reasons 
for one’s choice of words. There is not something like absolute loyalty to a 
piece of paper as is often blindly demanded for in Sinology or in Chinese 
studies. We do not translate the meaning of something written because we can 
never know what the author really had in mind. What we translate is our 
understanding of a given text. Here we have the choice to be true to our 
point of view and to our faculty of language, or true to the author, who might 
tell us about his former writing ambitions but can err, or not remember 
everything and sometimes also betray us by keeping silent or not telling the 
real story. Finally, we can be true to the work itself, which when fi nished, has 
not much to do with the author anymore. The work becomes independent and 
all we do is follow certain traits that are of great importance for us.
 If we want to judge the possibility or the possible depth of an encounter 
between Europe and China, we sometimes have to go deep into history. 
Brecht was an atheist; he was a member of the Communist Party. But his 
favorite book was the Bible. That is the reason why he was so excited when 
reading Wilhelm’s Daode Jing. He found there Martin Luther’s German.
 Martin Luther (1483‒1546), through translation of the Bible, created our 
mother tongue (German). One has to know that the most common languages 
of scholars before Goethe and sometimes even after him were Latin and 
French in Germanic “countries.” What we today call German used to be the 
language of the street that literati tried to avoid. Luther nevertheless was not 
afraid of forming it into powerful speech. He did this fi ve-hundred years ago. 
And we still read his version of the Bible, which of course, was revised 
several times. We are often told by publishers and by demanding readers that 
any translation becomes antiquated after thirty years. Nevertheless, besides 
the Luther Bible there are other translation works done in the 18th century that 
have not yet lost their German appeal after more than two-hundred years. 
Finally, Richard Wilhelm’s renderings of ancient Chinese philosophy are often 
reprinted, sold, and read even after one-hundred years. Why? The German of 
Richard Wilhelm was not only infl uenced by Luther, but by Goethe and 
Immanuel Kant (1724‒1804) as well. It is very beautiful German, full of 
rhythm and witty expressions. When Brecht in 1938 wrote his famous poem 
about Laozi he also made use of Biblical language as he found it in 
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Wilhelm’s Daode Jing.
 It sounds like a contradiction that an atheist should become fascinated by 
religiously-tinged language. But many announcements of Communist parties, 
including the Communist Party of China, have roots in the Christian way of 
speaking. Thus it does not make much sense to go on treating Christianity as 
the total “other” in regards to socialism. Both understand themselves as 
having a “holy mission.” This fact allows us also to reproach Richard 
Wilhelm less for his Christianization of certain aspects of Chinese thought. 
He found there something sacred, something holy that demands us to face 
history in a stricter manner.
 All early translations of the Daode Jing done in the 19th century were by 
theologians. Actually, early Sinology was a kind of theology. Sometimes even 
now it seems as if Sinology and theology are inseparable. Lauren Pfi ster (b. 
1956) of Baptist University (Hong Kong), one of the most important scholars 
of Confucian studies in the world, is a pastor. I myself turned once from 
theology to Sinology, but have been teaching religion on the mainland when 
asked to. What do I mean? Lauren Pfi ster and I do not see our daily encoun-
ters with China in the framework of the self and other. I am Chinese enough 
not to look at my Chinese friends as “the other” and they are open enough to 
defi ne themselves from a European context. This has nothing to do with 
“foreign infi ltration” (Überfremdung) or with self-colonization, as we are 
sometimes told by American or Chinese colleagues. Giving room to the 
“other” is only a question of developing into a complete person who needs 
more than just the elements of his own culture.
 The idea of zouchuqu, of being one’s own interpreter for the “West,” is 
always accompanied by the complaint of Chinese that the “West” does not 
suffi ciently understand or it misunderstands China, does not translate enough 
or introduce the country’s culture to others. But whenever, for instance, the 
China Daily mentions the “West,” all its news is only about America or 
England or the English-speaking world. The rest of Europe, the rest of the 
“Western” world, is not mentioned at all, just as if we were part of North 
America and shared the same characteristics. Whatever we Europeans do for 
China goes more or less unnoticed overseas; it is not much taken into 
consideration by American or Chinese scholars. This is not only because our 
mother languages are German or French, but because we think in a different 
way. In this respect we share the fate of our German colleagues in the fi eld of 
English literature, for instance. They publish in English, too, but they tell me 
they are not read by scholars between New York and San Francisco either.
V. Conclusion
 As the encounter between Europe and China has been taking place for 
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fi ve-hundred years already in a very fruitful way, European Sinology and 
Chinese studies should not be viewed in China via America. Their scholars 
make all kinds of groundless imputations about Europe. Thus, China must 
learn more of our languages and more of our history, especially scholars in 
Sinology and Chinese studies. They would recognize that we are not only 
unique in our way of doing research, but also for the quantity and quality of 
our translations of Chinese literature, philosophy, and history. One language, 
one prejudice, one direction: It is time that this kind of international Sinology 
and Chinese studies comes to an end. Otherwise, it does not make much 
sense to discuss encounters between Beijing, Paris, and Berlin anymore.
Author’s note: The word “man” in this essay refl ects the inclusive German 
meaning of man, woman, and child.
